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I. Introduction
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has been using alternative dispute resolution (ADR), most promi-
nently in cases concerning the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund or
CERCLA), 1 since the late 1980s.2 While the use of ADR within
the EPA is not widespread, it has become a useful tool for some
EPA attorneys and the regulated community to address difficult
and contentious environmental enforcement issues.3 Compared
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1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). For the purposes of this article, we are
focusing on ADR as a negotiation tool in which third party neutral mediators or
facilitators are called upon to aid parties' attempts to find a resolution to disputes
related to enforcement activities at the EPA.
2. See Lynn Peterson, The Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental
Disputes: The Experience of EPA Region V, 17 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 327, 339 (1992).
3. According to EPA ADR staff, between one and five percent of cases eligible to
use ADR actually use it. Interview with EPA staff (Spring, 1999).
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with other federal agencies and departments, the EPA is a leader
in the use of ADR in resolving enforcement disputes.4
Although the literature on the EPA's use of ADR in the en-
forcement context is sparse, a few articles have explored the sub-
ject.5 Lynn Peterson, in her article entitled The Promise Of
Mediated Settlements of Environmental Disputes,6 tracked and
evaluated the early use of ADR in EPA's Region 5 and identified
eight factors, ordered by importance, for exploring the mediation
potential of a Superfund case. 7 These factors included: EPA's will-
ingness to litigate, identification of issues suited to mediation,
timing considerations, nature of the parties to the dispute, num-
ber of parties and participation by non-parties, amount in dispute,
and the ability of the parties to share mediation costs.8
In 1990, Heidi Wilson Abbott issued a somewhat cynical prog-
nosis for the EPA enforcement ADR program as applied to
Superfund cases.9 While documenting several cases where ADR
was successfully used during the enforcement process, Abbott
found an overall reluctance of EPA officials to use the ADR pro-
cess as well as a fundamental distrust of settlement through ADR
by potentially responsible parties (PRPs).1° She concluded that
public issues were more likely to be resolved in part by private
parties rather than through EPA involvement." In addition, ac-
cording to Abbott, the risks to PRPs were too large for them to
pursue ADR in enforcement actions.' 2
Leonard Charla and Gregory Parry, while focusing in part on
steering committees formed by PRPs at EPA enforcement sites,
summed up the pros and cons of using ADR in Superfund cases in
the early 1990s as follows:
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY ENFORCEMENT & SITE-RE-
LATED ACTIONS (1999) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT ON ADR].
5. See generally William H. Hyatt, Jr., Taming the Environmental Litigation Ti-
ger, 5 J. ENVTL. REG. 91, 94 (1995); Peterson, supra note 2, at 338; Leonard F. Charla
& Gregory J. Parry, Mediation Services: Successes and Failures of Site-Specific Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89, 97 (1991); Heidi Wilson Abbott, The
Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Superfund Enforcement, 15 WM. & MARY J.
ENVTL. L. 47 (1990).
6. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 338.
7. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 330.
8. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 330.
9. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 47.
10. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 47.
11. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 47.
12. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 47.
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When properly utilized, a number of ADR techniques provide
good results at sites, including equitable allocations of liability,
competent development of facts, facilitation and mediation ser-
vices, and savings of time and transaction costs. Negatives can
be high expenses, protracted delays, work product of questiona-
ble quality, and failure to accomplish outcomes intended .... 13
William Hyatt reported that ADR had become "virtually the
norm at [EPA] multiparty Superfund sites for resolving contribu-
tion claims" among private parties by 1995.14
In order to obtain a more current and comprehensive picture
of EPA ADR enforcement activities, a four-part evaluation of
these activities was conducted between 1998 and 2000. This ef-
fort, funded by the Hewlett Foundation, utilized in-depth tele-
phone interviews, 15  government statistics, 16  and archival
records.' 7 The four groups examined were (1) EPA ADR special-
ists (eighteen out of twenty were interviewed); (2) potentially re-
sponsible parties (PRPs) to primarily Superfund cases (a stratified
random sample of twenty-five were interviewed); (3) third party
neutrals used to convene, facilitate or mediate the cases (we inter-
viewed twenty-two for a response rate of sixty-nine percent);' 8 and
(4) agency enforcement attorneys who had participated in an EPA
enforcement ADR process (sixty-one, or seventy-eight percent,
were interviewed).
The overall goals of this project included (1) evaluating the
use of ADR in EPA enforcement cases, particularly in Superfund
cases; (2) examining the sources of obstacles and assistance to
ADR efforts at the EPA; (3) suggesting ways in which the EPA
might improve its ADR programs; and (4) drawing lessons from
EPA's experiences that may be helpful to other agencies or
organizations.
This article explains and analyzes the results of the portion of
the study designed to explore the views of EPA attorneys on the
current status of ADR use in enforcement actions. The next sec-
13. Charla & Parry, supra note 5, at 97.
14. Hyatt, supra note 5, at 94.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See STATUS REPORT ON ADR, supra note 4.
17. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENFORCEMENT
RECORDS.
18. The EPA submitted a list of forty-five third party neutrals. From this list,
seven stated they had never served as a neutral on an EPA case, five could not be
located due to a change of address, three declined to comment, and seven could not be
reached.
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tion explains the data collection methods employed to collect the
information used in the analysis. Part III provides detailed infor-
mation about the results of the study including the case evalua-
tions, the role of third party neutrals in the ADR process, attorney
satisfaction with the ADR process, attorney satisfaction with the
outcome, and additional positive and negative effects of the ADR
process. This part also provides overall evaluations and com-
ments from EPA attorneys and highlights barriers to the success-
ful use of ADR as well as sources of support for the process. Part
IV provides recommendations for an improved EPA ADR enforce-
ment program and presents guidelines that other agencies may
wish to follow based upon the EPA ADR experiences. Part V of-
fers concluding remarks.
II. Data Collection
To glean an assessment of the EPA ADR program through the
eyes of EPA enforcement attorneys, interviews were conducted
with sixty-one EPA attorneys during the spring of 1999. Each in-
terview lasted between thirty and ninety minutes, and concerned
conflict resolution processes that occurred between 1988 and
1998. The names of all EPA attorneys who participated in ADR
processes were obtained through the EPA's enforcement ADR pro-
gram. While an attempt was made to contact every EPA attorney
whose name was provided, some attorneys had retired, moved to
private practice, were unreachable, or declined to participate. The
final response rate was approximately seventy-eight percent.
Nine of the EPA's ten regional offices are represented in this
study. The omitted regional office has a fairly inactive ADR pro-
gram and no attorneys from this region who had participated in
an enforcement ADR process could be located. The interview pro-
tocol included fifty-four open-ended and Likert scale questions.
The survey covered case details, satisfaction with the EPA en-
forcement ADR processes and outcomes, satisfaction with third
party neutral mediators and facilitators, barriers to increased
ADR use in the enforcement context, sources of support for en-
forcement ADR at the EPA, and ideas for improving enforcement
ADR at the EPA.
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III. Results
A. Cases Evaluated
Detailed information was gathered on sixty-one EPA enforce-
ment cases in which ADR processes and techniques were utilized.
The cases varied widely in the number of participants, number of
parties involved, settlement range, and other key variables. Of
the sixty-one cases for which data was gathered, approximately
fifty-eight percent were completely settled after ADR, seven per-
cent were partially settled, while thirty-four percent were not set-
tled through the use of ADR. Monetary settlements ranged from
one thousand dollars to ninety-five million dollars, with most set-
tlements involving tens of millions of dollars. Some cases were
resolved with one meeting, while other cases spanned up to four
years.
The number of parties at the table ranged between two and
over one hundred. In fact, ten percent of the cases involved more
than one hundred parties, while about fifty percent involved five
or fewer parties. The PRPs were comprised of small to large com-
panies; individual citizens; tribal groups; and government bodies
at the federal, state, and local level. Citizen groups participated
in four of the cases. In some cases, EPA attorneys or other EPA
employees referred the case to ADR, while in others the PRPs or
the courts suggested that ADR be used. While variation among
regions exists, in most regions no clear ADR referral mechanism
existed at the time of this survey.
B. Selection of Third Party Neutrals
The selection of an outside neutral mediator is a crucial part
of the ADR process. When parties work together to choose a quali-
fied neutral they can begin to build a foundation of cooperation
and gain confidence in the ADR process. In most cases, the ADR
specialist from each region posed criteria for the selection of neu-
trals. The primary EPA contractor then chooses the third party
neutral. 19 Sixteen of the attorneys interviewed, however, reported
a perception that the EPA chose the mediator in their case, even
though the EPA's contractor chose the mediator. In twenty of the
cases examined, mediators or other neutral professionals were se-
lected by mutual agreement of the parties. Eleven attorneys
19. During the time period examined for this research, RESOLVE of Washington
D.C. was the primary contractor that provided third party neutral subcontractors to
the EPA.
5
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
stated that the courts chose the neutrals, while the remaining at-
torneys expressed uncertainty as to who chose the neutral used in
their case. All attorneys interviewed stated that they knew of no
formal criteria for mediator selection.
In the majority of the cases, the parties shared the costs of
ADR. However, the Superfund Reform Initiative 2o does set aside
limited funds for ADR and, as a result, the EPA was able to bear
all costs associated with some of those mediations. When parties
cannot afford an outside professional mediator, they may also
have the option of using an "inside neutral" mediator. This is an
EPA employee, trained in ADR techniques, who has no direct in-
volvement in the case at hand. Only two of the attorneys inter-
viewed stated that the parties had used an inside neutral
mediator in their cases.
C. Results of Attorney Interviews
Attorneys were questioned about their satisfaction with the
EPA enforcement ADR process, the outcome, and the mediator or
neutral third party, and attorney's perception of ADR process gen-
erally. Responses were recorded on a five-point Likert scale rang-
ing from very satisfied (assigned a score of 1) to very dissatisfied
(assigned a score of 5).
1. Attorney Satisfaction with Enforcement ADR Process
Consistent with the literature on this subject, attorneys were
least satisfied with the amount of control they had over the pro-
cess and the outcome with mean scores of 2.36 and 2.19 respec-
tively.21 Attorneys were more satisfied with the amount of their
participation in the process (1.38), the ability to present their side
of the dispute (1.43), and the fairness of the process overall (1.51).
See Figure 1. One attorney noted that the parties retain much
more influence over the outcome of a case through mediation than
through adjudication. "Throwing a case before a judge to decide
reflects the ultimate lack of control," commented one attorney.
20. Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: FY 1993-94 Status Report on Use of ADR in Enforcement & Site Related Actions,
http://clients.dpra.com/adr/statusFY93_94.htm#pilot (last updated June 23, 1999).
21. See, e.g., Lisa Bingham & Charles Wise, The Administrative Dispute Resolu-
tion Act: How do We Evaluate Its Success?, 6 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 383
(1996); Michael Stubbs, Environmental Mediation in Planning Appeals: Lessons from
the Land & Environment Court of New South Wales, 39 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 273
(1996).
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Figure 1:
Attorney's Satisfaction with the ADR Process
The opportunity to present EPA's side of the dispute
The amount of attorney participation in the ADR
process
The amount of control attorney had over the process
The opportunity to discuss multi-faceted technical
Issues
The fairness of the ADR process
1= very satisfied,
5= very dissatisfied
1.43
1.38
2.34
2.09
1.51
2. Attorney Satisfaction With The Outcome
Most attorneys were either very satisfied or somewhat satis-
fied with the outcome of the ADR process (mean score of 1.77).
They were somewhat less satisfied with the speed of resolution
(2.38) and the positive impact the outcome would have on the
long-term relationships of the parties (2.17). Interestingly, EPA
attorneys did not feel that the resolutions reached through ADR
were more likely to endure than those reached through litigation
(2.21). Overall, EPA attorneys were slightly more than somewhat
satisfied with the overall outcome reached through ADR. See Fig-
ure 2. With such high satisfaction levels, one might expect in-
creases in the frequency with which ADR is used compared to
adjudication. Unfortunately, little quantitative data on this exists
at the EPA, but comments of attorneys interviewed for this study
point in the opposite direction. Based on interview responses, the
use of ADR does not seem to be widespread within the EPA, nor
does it seem to be growing rapidly.22
Figure 2: 1= very satisfied,
Attorney's Satisfaction with the outcome of ADR 5= very dissatisfied
Control attorney had over outcome 2.19
Speed with which ADR proceeded 2.38
Positive impact ADR will have on parties' relationships 2.17
The enduring resolution of the dispute compared to
litigation 2.21
The outcome compared to expectations before ADR 1.85
The outcome overall 1.77
22. This may be changing. A recent agency notice announced that EPA is plan-
ning to increase the use of ADR techniques and practices across all agency programs.
See Interim Statement of Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 Fed. Reg.
13,383 (March 13, 2000).
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7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
3. Attorney Satisfaction with Third Party Neutrals
Satisfaction with the mediator, facilitator, or non-binding
cost/liability allocator varied dramatically among attorneys, sug-
gesting the need for greater quality control in this area. Inciden-
tally, during the period of this study, the EPA did not conduct
routine evaluations of mediators or the ADR processes utilized.
Attorneys were asked to rate their satisfaction with the neutral's
skill at finding a resolution (1.81), substantive knowledge (1.79),
respect shown to parties (1.28), and overall performance (1.6).
While all of these scores reflect mean averages between "very sat-
isfied" and "somewhat satisfied," they hide the enormous varia-
tion in individual satisfaction. One EPA attorney relayed
dissatisfaction with the mediators in these words:
You get two types- either you get a glorified secretary as a
mediator who gets a lot of money to listen, organize meetings,
and make sure documents are exchanged. We could do this our-
selves anyway. They are meek and mild facilitators who write
lists on the board and go over everyone's interests, when we al-
ready know all that. It's a waste of time! It's a huge rip-off of
government money. The EPA attorneys and staff are becoming
very cynical about ADR. Also, the mediators are being evalu-
ated so they are afraid to-be frank, put pressure on the parties,
or tell them how their case looks.
Alternatively, you get mediators who act like evaluators
and pressure you to lower your bottom line until you settle. If
you get a mediator doing this and they lack a good knowledge of
Superfund law, they are often incorrect about their estimation
of the strength of the EPA's case. Attorneys are afraid they will
be pressured to settle for less than they should by a mediator
who is unfamiliar with Superfund.23
Other attorneys noted that mediation requires a "strong,"
"forceful," "prepared," and "knowledgeable" mediator who moves
the proceedings along quickly and efficiently.
A typically positive comment by one attorney summarizes his
satisfaction with the process:
Our mediator was prepared, respectful, and knowledgeable
about the subject matter. He took great strides to act in an im-
partial fashion and helped us to think creatively about possible
23. While this attorney mentions mediator evaluations, no systematic effort to
evaluate mediators was found in our survey.
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"win-win" options. The process he suggested to us was fair.
When we strayed from the process we all agreed to at the begin-
ning of the mediation, he reminded us of our commitment and
pulled us back on board. All parties left the table with an over-
all sense of satisfaction.
Would I participate in enforcement ADR again? Definitely
yes. The process forced the parties to be less adversarial than in
litigation. There was less posturing and more problem solving.
All in all it was a very positive experience.
Figure 3: 1= very satisfied,
Attorney's Satisfaction with the Mediator/Neutral 5= very dissatisfied
Mediator's/Neutral's preparedness 1.49
Respect shown by the mediator/neutral 1.28
Mediator's/neutral's knowledge regarding the substance
of the dispute 1.79
Mediator's/Neutral's impartiality 1.43
Mediator's/Neutral's skill in opening up new options 1.96
Mediator's/Neutral's skill in aiding resolution 1.81
Mediator's/Neutral's fairness 1.51
Mediator's/Neutral's performance overall 1.60
4. Additional Effects of the ADR Process
(a) Transformational Benefits
Clearly, the primary goal of ADR at the EPA is to reach set-
tlements more quickly and efficiently than is typically the case
with litigation. While ADR can be a vital tool in encouraging more
efficient dispute resolution, it may also be a forum through which
participants learn better conflict management skills. Organiza-
tions experiencing high levels of interpersonal conflicts among
employees, or problems dealing constructively with the regulated
community may decide to adopt a "transformative" model: one
which focuses on improving the relationships and conflict manage-
ment skills of the disputing parties, rather than one which focuses
primarily on resolving the particular dispute which brought the
parties to the negotiating table.24 Bush and Folger call this the
"recognition" dimension of mediation.25
24. See ROBERT A. BARACH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT & RECOGNITION 81-112 (Jos-
sey-Bass eds. 1994).
25. Id.
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In addition to questions about the mediator's performance
and satisfaction with the ADR process and ADR's outcome, our
survey included a number of questions designed to measure the
"transformative" impact of ADR at the EPA. Figure 4 displays the
results of these questions.
Figure 4: 1= very satisfied,
Attorney's Perception of ADR Process Generally 5= very dissatisfied
Mediator/Neutral helped clarify parties' goals and
choices 2.45
Others listened to attorney's point of view 2.08
Others learned something new about attorney's view 2.34
Attorney learned something new about others' views 2.25
Attorney acknowledged others' interests and views 1.94
The mean average responses for these questions was slightly
lower than for questions dealing with attorney's satisfaction with
the mediator, ADR process, or ADR's outcome. Attorneys agreed
somewhat with the statement: "Others listened to my point of
view" (2.08), but felt it was less likely that others learned some-
thing new about their point of view (2.34), or that the attorney
him/herself had learned something new about the other's point of
view (2.25). The majority of attorneys did feel they had acknowl-
edged the interests and views of the other parties to some extent
(1.94). However, one respondent remarked that this was an aca-
demic question, since settlement was all that mattered. While the
EPA's enforcement ADR programs are oriented toward settlement
rather than to transformation of the relationship among partici-
pants, the ability of alternative dispute resolution to improve
working relationships between the Agency and its regulated com-
munity is an interesting one worthy of future investigation.
(b) Effects When Settlement is Not Reached
In approximately one-third of the enforcement ADR cases
which were the subject of this survey, settlement was not reached
through the ADR process. In these cases, attorneys were asked
whether other positive or negative effects have accrued from the
use of ADR. Some of the responses touched on the predicted
transformative benefits of mediation discussed previously. Most
attorneys believed that ADR had benefits including the creation or
improvement of dialogue between and among the parties. ADR
also helped to document and organize information, gave all sides
the opportunity to share their view of the case, increased the over-
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all knowledge level about the site of contamination at issue, in-
creased mutual understanding, and encouraged the parties to be
more open to the viewpoints of others.
Negative effects from the use of ADR reported by a minority
of attorneys (eight) included lost time, loss of agency credibility,
damaged relationships between and among parties, feelings of fa-
tigue, and feelings of being personally attacked. In spite of a fail-
ure to reach settlement, fifteen attorneys noted positive effects
from ADR. Five other attorneys stated that no positive effects ac-
crued from the use of ADR. Twelve attorneys noted no negative
effects from the 'unsuccessful' use of ADR.
(c) Innovations
When asked, "What is innovative about the EPA's use of
ADR?" most attorneys answered that the mere existence of ADR
at the EPA was innovative. Those making such comments often
compared the EPA with other federal organizations such as the
Department of Interior and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which, according to the interviewees, have less extensive ADR
programs. Five attorneys noted that ADR adds flexibility when
crafting solutions to complex problems. Others commented that
ADR allows parties to work cooperatively toward a solution,
rather than staying in the adversarial mode. This "adds a level of
comfort and removes a layer of tension and contempt," one attor-
ney articulated. Three attorneys also noted that the use of ADR
moves the focus away from litigation and reflects a change in the
Agency's mindset or culture. A few others mentioned the EPA's
in-house neutral program as an important innovation.
The EPA and other regulatory agencies often work repeatedly
with the same regulated entities over many years. Conversations
with EPA attorneys reveal that mediation often allows people
with historically adversarial relationships to move past the stereo-
types of "polluters" and "bureaucrats," in order to view others as
individuals and form more cooperative working relationships. At-
torneys frequently stated that mediation encouraged "reasonable-
ness" and "flexibility" among parties. Of course ADR does not
always result in better relationships, but to the extent that this
occurs, an improved public image and the reduced frequency of
future disputes may be important incentives for regulatory agen-
cies or private firms to create ADR programs.
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D. Additional Attorney Observations and Comments
The final segment of the interviews asked the EPA attorneys
to share their views as to what works, what does not work, what
the barriers and obstacles to ADR in the enforcement context are,
and what its sources of support are. It is clear to most attorneys
that the regional ADR specialists have a big impact on the size
and success of each region's enforcement ADR programs. One re-
gion has a full-time ADR Specialist and this region reports more
frequent use of, and more success with, ADR. Regions with fairly
inactive, part-time ADR specialists are less likely to have active,
innovative enforcement ADR programs.
Attorneys stated that skilled, well-prepared, and assertive
mediators were vital to successful ADR outcomes. On the whole,
the majority of attorneys felt that ADR was an important tool that
should remain available to EPA attorneys. Some attorneys la-
mented that some funding exists with which to hire Superfund
mediators, but funding was difficult to find in most other types of
disputes (e.g., water quality disputes).
Other attorneys stated that efficient case screening is indis-
pensable to a successful ADR program. Currently, case screening
methods vary highly among regions and tend to be very informal.
Several attorneys (as well as ADR specialists) interviewed called
for the routine screening of all cases for the use of ADR. The at-
torneys suggested that the following types of cases are most ame-
nable to ADR at the EPA: (1) cases involving large monetary
sums, in which many parties exist but none is clearly the most
liable and financially viable; (2) cases where necessary data are
incomplete, and will remain incomplete due to the age of the site
or other factors; and (3) cases involving cost allocation, generally.
Another attorney expressed the opinion that small cases cost
more to mediate than they are worth and that they usually settle
before going to court anyway. Other attorneys noted that deci-
sion-making through alternative dispute resolution is more stable
in the long run and encourages parties to be "more reasonable -
through social pressure" and "reduces needless posturing." Two
attorneys also noted that conflicts must be "ripe" for mediation.
"Frustration levels rise and parties have a need to express views
that are not aired in the litigation process," said one attorney.
When personality differences or similar difficulties result in a
stalemate, mediation is often a more appropriate venue for pursu-
ing settlement, especially if the parties must continue to work to-
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gether in the future (e.g., on an ongoing clean-up of a
contaminated area, or as regulators and regulated entities). 26
Opportunities for improvement exist within the EPA's en-
forcement ADR program. First, more than ten percent of attor-
neys commented on the varying skill levels among mediators and
the potentially negative impact that "unskilled" mediators may
have on the ADR process and outcome. One respondent stated
that parties should take the time necessary to find the right medi-
ator for their case. Second, when a large number of parties exist,
posturing may increase and "crowd control" becomes difficult.
Breaking into subgroups or forming a steering committee has
proven useful. Third, when the EPA pays for the mediator, par-
ties may suspect bias. Ideally, the cost of the mediator should be
borne equally by all parties, according to the majority of EPA at-
torneys interviewed. When many small parties are involved, it
may become necessary for EPA to take on a larger share of the
costs of mediation or find another low-cost alternative. Fourth,
when numerous parties are named in an EPA enforcement action,
it is helpful if they can work out their differences before they meet
with the EPA in order to negotiate more cohesively and efficiently.
Finally, a few attorneys stated that the success of the program
would depend on its ability to avoid excessive bureaucratization.
This will be difficult as the Agency treads the fine lines between
encouraging ADR's use, screening cases, and finding funding,
while keeping its enforcement ADR programs user-friendly.
1. Barriers to Successful Enforcement ADR at the EPA
The most commonly cited barrier to the success of ADR at the
EPA was dissatisfaction with the contracting process for neutrals.
Attorneys stated that it often took a long time for a mediator to be
selected and funding constraints often made it difficult to choose
the most qualified mediators.27 Another commonly cited barrier
to ADR's success was the perceived opposition to ADR from DOJ.
Frequently, the EPA and the DOJ must work together to resolve
Superfund and other cases as EPA often becomes DOJ's client
when a lawsuit is filed. EPA attorneys stated that DOJ attorneys
seemed less enthusiastic than EPA attorneys about ADR's use
and less flexible when taking part in mediation. One attorney re-
ported, for example, that the mediator assigned to his cases was
26. See id.
27. According to EPA Headquarter ADR specialists, this problem has been reme-
died as of June 1, 2000, and mediators can now be hired with two weeks notice.
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denied access to key DOJ decision-makers needed to solidify an
agreement.
Slightly less than ten percent of attorneys noted that many
attorneys have a bias against using ADR. Responses included:
"Attorneys don't think they need help in their negotiations" and
"There is a cultural bias against using ADR as some attorneys feel
they shouldn't give up their power." One attorney reported that
they were rewarded financially and through promotions for being
"vicious attack dogs," and not by resolving disputes. Attorneys
cited concerns that seeking mediation might be seen as signaling
a weak case to the opposition. An institutionalized approach to
screening every case could overcome this common misperception.
Finally, the lack of ADR training and financial resources to sup-
port ADR were also cited as barriers to progress.
2. Sources of Support: EPA ADR Specialists, EPA Upper-
Level Management, and Experienced ADR Attorneys
Despite these challenges, there are key sources of support for
enforcement ADR within the EPA: the ADR Specialists at EPA
Headquarters and in the regional offices, EPA upper-level man-
agement, and attorneys experienced in ADR processes. Nine EPA
regions have at least one part-time ADR liaison, while one region
has a full-time liaison. Not surprisingly, the region with the full-
time liaison has mediated more cases than the others. Many at-
torneys noted that these specialists were critical to the success of
the EPA's ADR programs. These individuals promote and provide
training, aid in the selection of mediators, provide in-house media-
tion, track down resources for ADR, and occasionally direct cases
toward ADR. According to interview responses, there also ap-
pears to be fairly strong support for ADR among upper managers
and among attorneys who have participated in at least one ADR
process. These individuals are indispensable to the future success
of ADR at the EPA.
IV. Recommendations
Overall, EPA attorneys are satisfied with the ADR program.
Nonetheless, suggestions for improving the EPA's use of ADR
emerge.
It is important to have someone within the organization re-
sponsible for promoting ADR and training employees in negotia-
tion and mediation skills. These skills are helpful in formal
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mediations. They also, however, have the potential to encourage
employees to resolve disputes early, before a formal process of dis-
pute resolution is required.
ADR participants need to have some sense of control over the
ADR process and outcome before they will agree to use ADR in an
enforcement context. Toward this end, participants should take
part in choosing the neutral and designing the process through
which their dispute will be addressed. 28 In addition, employees
should be trained in the use of ADR in order to understand the
differences among arbitration, mediation, neutral fact-finding,
convening, and other forms of dispute resolution. With a better
understanding of the processes available, participants may be
more willing and able to use ADR.
The suggestions from the 1989 pilot project evaluation from
Region 5 need to be implemented to the fullest extent possible
throughout the agency. 29 This means (1) the EPA should offer in-
dividual and institutional incentives for appropriate ADR use, (2)
the EPA should provide middle managers and other relevant staff
with ADR training; and most importantly, (3) the EPA should
screen cases and/or develop referral mechanisms in order to use
ADR at an efficient level. Most of the attorneys with whom we
spoke were not familiar with the recommendations of the 1989 pi-
lot project evaluation.
While case referral and mediator evaluation mechanisms
should be further developed, the ADR program should strike a
healthy balance and avoid needless red tape. A few attorneys
noted that the program is becoming excessively bureaucratized.
The attractiveness of ADR lies in part in the hope of lowering
transaction costs and by-passing time-consuming litigation. Pro-
gram managers must attempt to institutionalize its use and as-
sure that it is being applied whenever appropriate, while avoiding
excessive bureaucratization-no simple task.
There must be greater quality control with regard to
mediators or other neutrals. All of the involved parties should
have input when it comes to screening and selecting mediators.
28. See, e.g., CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE & HEALTHY OR-
GANIZATIONS (1996).
29. See Peterson supra note 2, at 338 n.44 (citing RESOLVE, CENTER FOR ENVTL.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT: SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT PILOT MEDIATION
PROJECT CONDUCTED FOR U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION V 1 (1991) (available
from the Conservation Foundation 1250 Twenty-Fourth St., N.W., Wash., D.C.
20037)).
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For EPA attorneys to have faith in these individuals, they need to
be involved in the selection process. This should reduce fears
about losing control over the enforcement ADR process. Addition-
ally, at the conclusion of the ADR process the parties should have
the opportunity to evaluate each mediator/neutral in order to pro-
vide constructive feedback to the service providers while improv-
ing future quality control. Regional ADR specialists should
manage and share this information. The contracting process for
mediators can still be improved as well. The use of in-house neu-
trals may prove to be a cost-effective and useful option. In fact,
those attorneys that had taken part in an ADR process using an
in-house neutral were highly satisfied with the process and
outcome.
V. Conclusion
More than a decade has passed since the EPA first began
ADR in Superfund cases 30 and some important lessons have been
learned. While ADR programs must be tailored to the structure
and culture of individual organizations, large organizations and
agencies can benefit from observing the EPA's ADR enforcement
programs. These are highly complex and scientifically technical
multi-party disputes that often take many years to resolve. While
ADR is not appropriate for all cases, it is a highly underutilized
tool at the EPA. If ADR is to succeed and fulfill its potential
within the EPA, more attention needs to be paid to its institution-
alization in the new millennium.
30. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 374 n.47.
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